





Botnet Remediation in ISP networks

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ESNOG · 6th October 2011 · Barcelona

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- Context
- Detection
- Notification
- Remediation
- Study cases

Context

- Cybercrime is a major problem nowadays
- Cross-border incidents with impact on ...
 - Users
 - Service providers (reputation, infrastructure...)
- Containment or cleaning requires ...
 - Knowledge, skills and tools sometimes beyond average user
- Private/Public partnership needed
- Several key players directly involved
 - CERTs
 - LEAs
 - ISPs / Service Providers
 - AV/Security vendors
 - Academia
- Security means “*quality*” !!!

Detection

- Combination of methods, processes and tools
- Considerations
 - Time sensitive
 - Avoid false positives
 - Avoid disruption/transparent for end-users
 - Respect privacy (Personal Identifiable Information – PII)
- Threat classification
- Sources
 - Monitoring aggregate traffic
 - Flows
 - DNS
 - Relevant applications
 - 3rd party feeds
 - *Shadowserver, TeamCymru, Feedback loops...*
 - Feedback/notifications/complaints from users or customers
 - Active scanning
 - IDS or Honeypots

Notification

- Inform about the problem and next actions
- Considerations
 - Public Network Locations
 - Shared corporate/customer Ips
 - Contact data on service sign-up (preferred method)
 - End-user expertise
- Mechanisms
 - Email
 - Telephone call
 - Postal mail
 - Walled-garden (strict or leaky)
 - Instant messaging
 - Short Message Service (SMS)
 - Web browser

Remediation

- Remove, disable or render bot harmless
- Provide necessary tools and education
 - Security-oriented website
 - Security support forums (staff & volunteers)
 - Help for identification of affected device
- Remediation process should include
 - Help for backing up personal files (USB thumb/hard drives, cloud)
 - OS/SW patches downloading and/or AV updates
 - Autoupdate configuration explanation and check
 - Professional assistance options
 - Provide Software (*online* or CD/DVD) for remediation/cleaning
 - Inform corresponding LEA about infection
- An opportunity for professional remediation services
- What if a user refuses to remediate?

Study Cases

- Japan Cyber Clean Center (CCC)
 - https://www.ccc.go.jp/en_ccc/
- German Anti-Botnet
 - <https://www.botfrei.de/en/index.html>
- Australia IIA
 - <http://www.security.iaa.net.au/>

References

- *“Recommendation for the Remediation of Bots in ISP Networks”*, IETF Internet Draft (Sep, 2011)
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- *“IIA Guide for ISPs”*, Internet Industry Association (AU)
 - <http://iia.net.au/index.php/initiatives/isps-guide.html>
 - http://iia.net.au/images/resources/pdf/esecurity_code_consultation_version.pdf
- *“Voluntary Notification to Consumers regarding botnets and malware”*, NIST RFI (USA)
 - <http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/botnets-100411.cfm>
 - <http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2011/09/21/2011-24180/models-to-advance-voluntary-corporate-notification-to-consumers-regarding-the-illicit-use-of>
- *“CSIRC Working Group 8”*, FCC (USA)
 - <http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/communications-security-reliability-and-interoperability-council-iii>
- *“Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3)”* (USA)
 - <http://www.ic3.gov>



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